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Discussion After the Speeches of Jonathan T. Fried,
William S. Merkin and William H. Cavitt
HENRY T. KING: Regarding Bill Ferchat's comment, I believe
that we tend to fear Congress and are reluctant to present them with
these proposals. Is there any way to bring Congress into this process
without meeting such resistance?
JONATHAN T. FRIED: You are absolutely right, Henry any ad-
ministration on the U.S. side, conducting the negotiations properly,
needs to consult with Congress throughout the process, educating them
as well as taking instructions from them. They certainly have been doing
this throughout the Uruguay Round.
It is also important to remember that Congress is one among other
entities. In the context to foreign policy, some say that there are 535
Secretaries of State. This may also be said for the U.S. trade representa-
tives. Each Congressman looks at his own constituents, industries and
geographic regions, and attempts to secure his vision of trade policy in
the manner that is best suited to his own local or regional concerns.
Even during the free trade negotiations we consulted with Congress.
Here some voices are at least willing to consider the possibility of
some reforms to trade remedy laws. Certainly, some even credit Repre-
sentative Sam Gibbons with the compromise reached in the House. If
you choose to consult only with the lowest common denominator, you
will not receive an answer. If consult in an educated fashion, you can
nurture Congressional opinion, and I think there is room to do that here.
One thing that might make many Congressmen change their mind
would be evidence of injury to American companies. No one has focused
on the fact that although there were sixteen U.S. anti-dumping cases
against Canadian companies since 1980, there were also forty Canadian
anti-dumping cases against U.S. companies. If the U.S. bar or corporate
sector was more aggressive in the use of trade remedy laws, people would
then, in fact, be behind protection for their industries against the Cana-
dian companies. That could change the equation, and I think that is the
point Mr. Phillips made earlier.
WILLIAM S. MERKIN: You raise an excellent point, Jonathan.
Many members of Congress or their staff, need to be focused on the bene-
fit for the United States. One can not simply say to Congress, "We want
to implement a new system to prevent harassment for our good friends in
Canada." Congress will ask "Why should we bother? The Canadians
must have something up their sleeves, we do not see what is in it for the
United States." To find support in the United States for such changes, it
is essential to address those in Congress who, at the mere mention of U.S.
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trade remedy law, automatically react by saying, "Do not touch it. Do
not weaken it."
The question of administrative consultation with Congress is always
a difficult one. We receive negative publicity during our negotiations be-
cause it was generally felt that we did not adequately consult with Con-
gress. I can recall sessions where we had scheduled a briefing the Ways
and Means Committee and the only member who showed up, Sam Gib-
bons, did not even need to be convinced of the wisdom of what we were
doing. Many times, unless they see an immediate need to become in-
volved in an issue, Congressmen do not want to waste their time. It is
usually in the final stages of negotiations when they want to become in-
volved when it is usually too far along to really address these concerns.
On the other hand, if one has industry support and an established
agenda, then it would be important to undertake a program of educating
and changing the opinions of various Congressmen. Looking back at our
negotiations, as Bill and I indicated, we really did not know what we
wanted concerning the technical aspects of the anti-dumping law. And
candidly, I have described a generic situation pertaining to trade remedy
law, and the difficulties involved. I think it is safe to say that on the
Canadian agenda, the number one priority was the issue of sub-
sidy/countervail. I am not convinced that they knew going in what they
wanted to accomplish on the anti-dump side. Bill was focusing more on
the subsidy/countervail side where most of our early discussions took
place. So, it is difficult approach Congress with some general concept
without having all the details sorted out because they will immediately
ask a number of questions. If a negotiator does not have the answers,
then Congress will become leery of any future proposals.
JOHN R. MULLEN: What is the experience in dumping between
Mexico and the United States, and is that likely to be a priority issue on
the agenda of that free trade agreement negotiation?
WILLIAM H. CAVITT: My vague recollection is that the number
of cases between the United States and Mexico is quite small compared
with Canada, where the number is fairly large. There have only been a
few cases through the years that have received any visibility
BARRY SOLARZ: Mexico has had sixteen cases against the
United States since 1987. The United States has had three against
Mexico.
LAIRD D. PATTERSON: On the one hand there is discussion
concerning the grant for anti-dumping laws to these two similar econo-
mies. When we include Mexico, a complimentary economy, what does
that do to the theory?
JONATHAN T. FRIED: There is a continuing Canada-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement agenda, and regardless of whether we reach a trilateral
agreement, I think there is a series of items between Canada and the
United States that we can continue to address on a bilateral basis, includ-
Vol. 17:31 1991
2
Canada-United States Law Journal, Vol. 17 [1991], Iss. 1, Art. 13
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/cuslj/vol17/iss1/13
Fried, Merkin, Cavitt-DISCUSSION
ing certain laws, technical standards and agricultural groups. A trilat-
eral free trade agreement does not necessarily mean the unraveling of the
existing bilateral FTA, although, no one wants to prejudge the form or
structure of the end result. Let us just see what common issues we have
among the three countries. Having said that, it is contingent upon Can-
ada and the United States to continue to discuss anti-dumping and com-
petition on a bilateral basis, even within a trilateral free trade agreement
area. There is nothing theoretically impossible about that. So, I do not
see the two ideas as mutually exclusive.
RONALD J. WONNACOTT: Now that the United States seems
prepared to consider negotiating a bilateral agreement with Mexico, an
overlapping bilateral given the existence of the U.S.-Canadian bilateral
agreement, which would make the United States a hub in a small hub
and spoke system where Canada and Mexico are spokes. Is it recognized
in Washington, D.C. the disturbing worlds that this creates in which the
United States is assigning separate bilaterals for the sequence of appli-
cants? Even if these are consistent, they are going to be far less attractive
than an expanding free trade area, and of course, the objective of a coun-
try like Mexico is to tailor its agreement to its special needs. This means
that those agreements are likely to be inconsistent and that means that
the system is even more compromised. And is it as a necessity, is the cost
recognized of this hub and spoke or overlapping bilateral system to the
apparent beneficiary, the United States recognized as a necessity are the
various costs to the United States recognized as well, of course, as the
obvious cost to the spoke countries? Thirdly, is it recognized now that
the importance for these reasons of negotiating a trilateral agreement or
failing that, a agreement bilateral which could be carefully tailored to
simulate a trilateral system and could be very easily folded into a trilat-
eral sooner. I agree that every free trade agreement, every bilateral
agreement, does liberalize trade in some sense, but it is also true that
every non-multilateral free trade agreement does involve a protectionist
element. Now, in an expanding free trade area, that protectionist ele-
ment is damaging to excluded countries. In a hub and spoke system,
elements of protection are far more fundamental because they run right
through the system, leaving protection between all of the spoke countries
and therefore much more damaging. As a consequence, the protection is
greater, the damage is greater, and the potential gains are more substan-
tially compromised. Are these things recognized in Washington D.C. as
you are now, I understand, in a process of deciding historically which
route is going to be taken in a process in which the decision may be made
almost inadvertently?
WILLIAM H. CAVITT: Let me address the last question first. The
Administration, with complete agreement, in January, has asserted that
the United States continues to be committed to the multilateral trading
system. We want to the Uruguay Round to succeed, we want this patient
to survive. More than survive, to end up healthy and privy to the multi-
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lateral trading system for the future. In that context, I would note, how-
ever, that the history of other agreements like the European Community,
Australia and New Zealand, is that as long as they are trade liberalizing,
that is to say that barriers are moved between the members and no new
ones are erected vis-a-vise third countries, that the trade patterns demon-
strated that export growth, both to the members and to non-members, by
greater number than historical patterns. So that even separate regional
trade liberalization, therefore, does contribute to the multilateral trading
system. Now, obviously it benefits the members more than it benefits the
non-members, but historically both have profited.
With respect to the prospects of the North American Free Trade
Agreement as opposed to two bilateral agreements, clearly it is under-
stood as a matter of economics that because of administrative needs, a
North American Free Trade Agreement is preferable to two bilateral
agreements. I think for the same reasons, within the broader context of
the community, it is conceptually possible to negotiate in this case three
bilaterals, U.S.-Canada, U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Mexico and CAnada, and
to have them be structured in such a way that they are tantamount to a
North American Free Trade Agreement. We will have to see for the
future whether these things sort themselves out or not. My hope would
be that that is not the case, but rather that we end up with a single North
American Free Trade Agreement.
ROBERT MATHATHISON: I am somewhat concerned whether
you interpret it as a degree of pessimism or realism of Bill's pronuncia-
tion. However, I think he used a metaphor of the news that is on twenty-
four hours a day, when the cloud cover goes, people will make some sort
of damage assessment. When one looks at how global competitors are
projecting, whether it is economic power or financial power from the
East or Far East or whether we are talking about political power, we are
not moving in on agricultural reform from the European side. I think
one is faced with the reality, can you accept the status quo? I would hate
to think that sound economic reasoning in terms of fulfilling the promise
of the FTA cannot be communicated, and that the deliberations of this
particular group, if it comes up with a sense of logic, cannot be used in
some persuasive manner. So I would hope that we would have a much
more optimistic response. I know you have shaken everybody up or at
least me up, but how do we get to where we want to go, not so much that
we can get to where we want to go?
WILLIAM S. MERKIN: My purpose is not to discourage the ac-
tivity. My purposes is to put it into what I believe is a realistic context,
given what we went through with the basic negotiations. That there is a
tendency, especially in forums such as this, to say, "Well, this is great,
let's go, and give it to our negotiators and we expect to see you come
back with the deal." It does not work that simplistically, and I know
most of you realize that. I just want to make sure that people understood
that no matter how good your ideas are, there is a very difficult flow of
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context in which this has to be dealt with and I think some of those
discussions that have come up about finding what is in it for the United
States, that there is no side to this whole story of trade remedy law. It is
important in the beginning, in exercise of educating the political process,
not just the utility of a replacement system, but the potential importance
in the flow of context. I do not mean to say, everybody go home at lunch
time, you are wasting your time. What I am saying is, remember there is
a tough battle ahead, and you cannot just expect your two governments
on their own to be able to turn that process around.
JONATHAN T. FRIED: I think the bottom line is that it is a polit-
ical decision, elected politicians acted upon their constituents self-inter-
est. As Bill Cavitt has emphasized, you need to give the American
legislator a reason that makes it in his own interest to do so. I think your
discussions can be divided into four possible reasons that may come to
form. First, the number of anti-dumping cases against U.S. firms in
CAnada is twice as large as U.S. cases against Canadian firms. There is
more aggressive use of those laws in Canada. It is even of more interest
to U.S. firms to relieve themselves of the burden they face with the Cana-
dian laws. Secondly, Mexico has an interesting dimension, not only in
negotiating a bilateral agreement. American firms are suddenly facing
harassment or a taste of their own medicine. In Mexico, Korea and
other countries that may not even be as transparent or as judicial as Can-
ada and the United States are, there is going to be an even more immedi-
ate interest among American businessmen in doing something about the
current regime rather than no change. Third, the failure of MTM goes
two ways if it is a failure, and that is, "Well, we can't get anywhere in
businesses where there was resistance in anti-dumping reforming as it
was in 1985. We, in the United States are prepared to deal with people
who are prepared to pay in good coin, with people who negotiate in good
faith. Even though for the rest of the world we are not going to do any-
thing, for Canada since it is reciprocal and there is a common interest,
whether you want to call it a block methodology or not, some in the
United States might say, we should solidify within the North American
context. Finally, as before the recession in the United States that we saw
in the early 1980s, I think particularly in the Democratic Congress, there
will be renewed attention to the broader universe of competitiveness, and
what will enhance American industry global competitiveness and cer-
tainly strength competition law as a discipline to be put into that context
as well.
WILLIAM H. CAVITT: From my perspective, it seems to me we
are dealing here with a basic law that a body at rest remains at rest. The
dumping law currently is at rest. The case is yet to be made, for
whatever reasons that dumping laws should be replaced with something
else. Congress, and an not insignificant number of U.S. industrial inter-
ests, are likely to take the posture, "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." And
accordingly it seems to me and I think a lot of what Bill Merkin is saying
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is that it is incumbent upon those who see change to demonstrate if it is
necessary.
ROBERT A. FERCHAT: We would like to thank the panel very
much for their candor and openness and telling us how it is and how it
shapes up to be. We certainly agree with Bill Cavitt, it is a hell of a time
to be involved with trade, trade law and trade negotiations. It is very
exciting and I admire his presentation. As far as Bill Merkin is con-
cerned, we also admire Bill for the openness and honesty with us telling
us how it is. I really question whether Congress has the option to con-
tinue it comfortableness with the old regime because there is a new bu-
reau taking shape hemispherically throughout the alliances that are being
built in the world, I do not think it is open yet. And, Jonathan, I think
had a very interesting and accurate background for the whole scenario
system demand as to barriers, we have to lower barriers. We have to
expand our potential and in this particular case, anti-dumping 1907 1-B,
as the European Community, the Australian, New Zealand cooperation
has done. We think it is time to do it in Canada, and I think that the
opportunity is perhaps here, we just have to find other levers to push to
get it done. So thank you very much for your candor, your hard work
and your intellectual breath.
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